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Abstract
A large proportion of the Japanese elderly have accumulated assets in the form of housing
wealth. The elderly expect to fund consumption during their retirement by releasing housing
equity. This paper estimates a xed e¤ects model to examine the causal e¤ect of housing
assets on consumption, using panel data of Japanese elderly households from 2006 to 2015.
Contrary to the above expectation, the results suggest that changes in housing wealth do
not signicantly increase elderly consumption. The reason behind this result appears to be
that the elderly homeowners cannot release part of their housing wealth as cash through the
nancial sector. Instead, elderly homeowners leave their housing assets to their children,
and in exchange, receive cash to fund consumption. The impact on consumption, however,
is rather small. Moreover, this mechanism tends to operate only in urban areas where the
land values are relatively high. These results imply that housing wealth is available to only
a limited proportion of Japanese elderly homeowners.
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1 Introduction
Japans growth rate for the proportion of elderly in the population is the highest in the world.
According to the 2017 Annual Report on the Aging Society, the proportion of the population
aged 65 years or over has reached 26.7 percent, which is 9.0 percentage points higher than the
average for advanced countries. Accordingly, expenditure on social security is at its highest
ever level, and 67.9 percent of that expenditure is on the elderly in the form of public pensions
and medical benets. In an aged society such as Japan, housing assets are expected to be used
to maintain the welfare of the elderly. A large proportion of elderly households in Japan have
accumulated assets in the form of housing equity. The 2014 National Survey of Family Income
and Expenditure (NSFIE) reported that 88.2 percent of the elderly aged 65 years or over own
residential property, and this accounts for 67.8 percent of their total wealth. Releasing housing
equity, therefore, may smooth consumption through postretirement life and avoid placing a
heavy burden on the social security system (Noguchi, 1996; Mitchell and Piggott, 2004).
For example, increases in house prices that increase the available housing equity can thereby
stimulate consumption if the elderly sell part or all of their house. The Japanese elderly, however,
prefer to stay in their homes and seldom sell them to nance their consumption (Forrest et al.,
2003). Reverse mortgages, which allow elderly homeowners to borrow against the value of their
homes without selling them, potentially solve this issue. Yet, it is quite di¢ cult to convert
housing wealth into cash because the nancial sector does not readily provide loans against
properties, especially those of low value (Noguchi, 1996; Forrest et al., 2003; Mitchell and
Piggott, 2004; Izuhara, 2016). Data indeed demonstrate that the Japanese elderly are less likely
to release housing equity, even if they are aged 75 years or over (Murata, 2015). The literature
has suggested that elderly homeowners generally leave their housing assets to their children, and
consequently, they tend to hold on to their homes until death (Ohtake, 1991; Hirayama, 2010;
Ishino, 2011).
The relationship between housing assets and elderly consumption has received increasing
attention. Nevertheless, empirical studies are limited in Japan. In this regard, the present paper
attempts to empirically identify the causal e¤ect of housing wealth on elderly consumption using
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panel data of the Japanese elderly. We nd that changes in housing wealth have no signicant
e¤ects on the consumption of the elderly. The empirical results indicate that elderly borrowing is
not associated with housing assets. From a subsample analysis, we nd that housing assets have
a small but signicantly positive impact on the consumption of the elderly who have children.
These elderly can increase consumption because they can leave their housing assets to their
children in exchange for nancial help. However, this mechanism tends to operate only in urban
areas where land values are relatively high. Housing wealth appears to be held by only a limited
proportion of elderly homeowners in Japan.
2 Background
2.1 Literature review
The life cycle theory provides an insight into the decumulation behavior of elderly homeowners.1
The theory predicts that households who are assumed to maximize their lifetime utility prefer
to maintain a constant level of consumption throughout their lifetime. Therefore, households
smooth variations in income by accumulating wealth when income is relatively high and decumu-
lating when income is relatively low. Because elderly households are generally income poor and
asset rich, and housing is the main asset held by most households, the life cycle theory suggests
that elderly homeowners tend to mainly release their housing wealth by becoming renters (or
trading down) to nance postretirement consumption (Artle and Varaiya, 1978). If the elderly
sell their residences and become renters, then homeownership rates must decline in older age.
However, the decline is generally slow. For example, Venite and Wise (2002; 2004) found no
apparent decline in homeownership rates with age in the U.S. Evidence suggested that housing
wealth is typically not liquidated to fund consumption after retirement, because the U.S. elderly
generally prefer to stay in their homes. The empirical results of Painter and Lee (2009) in the
U.S. also demonstrated that the age of elderly homeowners is not related to the likelihood of
becoming renters or trading down. Chiuri and Jappelli (2010) found that homeownership rates
in 15 OECD countries start falling after age 70, and then experience only a one percentage point
decline per year after age 75. Angelini et al. (2014) used data on 13 European countries to study
1Modigliani (1986), which summarized his Nobel lectures, provided a detailed review of the life cycle hypothesis.
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residential moves beyond the age of 50. They found that moves are rare all over Europe, but
particularly so in Mediterranean countries.
The theory also suggests that an unanticipated increase in wealth allows households to in-
crease consumption over their lifetime. In our context, unexpected increases in house prices
tend to increase household wealth when homeowners trade down and use the proceeds for con-
sumption. This is called the direct housing wealth channel. Because elderly homeowners have a
relatively short expected life horizon, their consumption expenditures are more likely to respond
to house wealth gains (Li and Yao, 2006). However, the empirical evidence of Skinner (1996),
who used one wave of household-level panel data in the U.S., suggested that housing wealth
windfalls for the elderly only a¤ect a small group of people protected against contingencies after
retirement. Using cross-section harmonized-wealth micro-data, Sierminsska and Takehtamanova
(2012) found that housing wealth has a positive and signicant impact on consumption for ages
6574 in Canada, Finland, Germany, and Italy, but an insignicant impact in the U.S. Moreover,
their results suggested that the consumption of the oldest age group (75 years or over) does not
signicantly respond to housing wealth in all countries.
Alternatively, it is rational for elderly homeowners to use reverse mortgages when housing
prices increase. According to the life cycle theory, reverse mortgages increase householdsutility
if they relax collateral borrowing constraints to allow consumption smoothing over their lifetime.
Elderly homeowners therefore have the advantage of the relaxed collateral constraint stemming
from the housing price appreciation and can increase their consumption (Davido¤ et al., 2017).
This is called the housing collateral channel. Using household-level pseudo-panel data for the
U.K., Campbell and Cocco (2007) found that the consumption of elderly homeowners responds
to a large extent through this channel: a one percent increase in house prices leads to a 1.7
percent increase in consumption. However, using the same data set, but using a di¤erent model
specication, Attanaio et al. (2009) obtained empirical results that are in sharp contrast with
those of Campbell and Cocco (2007): the consumption response estimate was only 0.04 percent
and statistically insignicant. The latter result suggests that reverse mortgage demand is low
despite the consumption smoothing benets they can provide to elderly homeowners. Using a
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survey of U.S. elderly homeowners, Davido¤ et al. (2017) indicated that the low demand for
reverse mortgages can be explained by potential borrowersinsu¢ cient knowledge or product-
specic literacy.2
Recent papers based on rich micro-data sets have found little e¤ect of housing price ap-
preciation on elderly homeownersconsumption. For example, Browning et al. (2013) used a
Danish panel data set, which allowed them to control for the possible inuence from unobserved
household-specic e¤ects, and found no evidence that older homeowners react to house price
changes. Unlike previous studies, Atalay et al. (2016) considered the impact of self-reported
house values rather than regional house price indices on consumption, using repeated household
surveys from Australia and Canada. Self-reported house values may have the advantage of in-
cluding heterogenous information on each type of housing. The empirical results suggested that
a higher housing price level only raises the consumption of the elderly to a small extent. Naoi
(2014) provided evidence showing that self-reported house prices have a signicantly positive
impact on the consumption of elderly homeowners using panel data on Japanese households.
However, the impact is small and statistically signicant only at the 10 percent level. Hori
and Niizeki (2017) used a Japanese micro-data set covering approximately 500,000 households.
Instead of using self-reported or regionally averaged housing values, the housing wealth of in-
dividual households was estimated by matching the sample with other o¢ cial statistics. The
regression results suggested that housing wealth has a small but signicantly positive impact on
elderly consumption.
The bequest motive of elderly homeowners has also been highlighted in the literature.3
Nakajima and Telyukoba (2012) developed a life cycle model with housing and a bequest motive.
A simulation suggested that households who want to accumulate assets in retirement because
of the bequest motive prefer to do so in housing. As a result, the bequest motive is more
likely to increase the homeownership rate of the elderly. Nakajima and Telyukoba (2017), using
simulations of a model that was extended from their previous studies, found that the bequest
2Davido¤ (2004) found that in the U.S., the elderly reduce their housing equity without selling their home by
spending less on routine maintenance to smooth consumption. Moriizumi et al. (2014) provided similar empirical
evidence for Japan.
3Precautionary saving against future economic emergencies is another reason why the elderly continue to retain
housing equity (Skinner, 1996; Yang et al., 2017).
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motive dampens the demand for reverse mortgages. Skinner (1996) suggested that altruistic
parents who obtain a windfall of housing wealth tend to leave it to their children, who struggle
with increases in house prices. Megbolugbe et al. (1997) demonstrated that elderly homeowners
are less likely to liquidate housing wealth when their childrens income is low in the U.S.,
suggesting that elderly parents behave consistent with the altruism hypothesis (Barro, 1974).
Elderly homeowners cannot obtain cash and thus nance consumption in the altruistic case.
Painter and Lee (2009), however, found that living geographically close to ones children lowers
the likelihood of becoming a renter or trading down for elderly homeowners in the U.S. They
suggested that geographic proximity proxies stronger connections to their children, and parents
are therefore more likely to save their housing wealth as a bequest rather than spend it. Using
micro-level data from China, Yang et al. (2017) found that changes in housing wealth have
no e¤ect on elderly consumption. However, in a subsample analysis, a signicantly positive
relationship between consumption and house prices was observed among elderly homeowners
who live with their children. They explained this result by relying on the fact that co-residence
may enable elderly parents to provide childcare for their grandchildren in exchange for receiving
nancial transfers from their adult children. Empirical evidence from Painter and Lee (2009)
and Yang et al. (2017) appears to suggest that elderly parents behave based on self-interested
exchange with their children to some degree (Bernheim et al., 1985). In particular, the elderly
may choose to insure against longevity risk by making an implicit annuity contract with their
children, whereby parents receive an annuity from their children until they die in return for
leaving bequests (Kotliko¤ and Spivak, 1981). Horioka (2002) suggested that one variant of this
type of contract is an intrafamily reverse mortgage, where parents leave bequests in the form of
housing assets. Because unanticipated increases in home values tend to encourage children to
provide nancial support, the elderly can fund consumption through the intrafamily nancing
channel.
2.2 Housing assets of the Japanese elderly
In Japan, the overall rate of homeownership has been stable at around 60 percent over the past
four decades (Housing and Land Survey, HLS). However, it should be emphasized that changes
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in the demographic composition of ownership have supported this stability. Figure 1 suggests
that the proportion of owner households in the young (aged less than 40 years) and middle-aged
(aged 4059 years) groups has declined substantially since 1980, while that in the elderly (aged
60 years or over) group has remained constant at approximately 80 percent. This implies that
the share of elderly among all homeowners increased dramatically. Indeed, the share was 18.6
percent in 1983 and climbed to 30.9 percent in 1993. In 2013, 54.9 percent of homeowners were
elderly aged 60 years or over. Figure 2 presents cohort-adjusted homeownership-age proles for
homeowners in their 50s and 60s in our data. The gure shows marked cohort e¤ects where
the homeownershipage proles for homeowners in their 60s are always higher than those for
homeowners in their 50s. However, there are no apparent reductions in homeownership rates
over time for both cohorts.
On average, the elderly are cash poor but asset rich. The 2014 NSFIE estimated that annual
income per elderly aged 65 years or over is 4.0 million yen, which is 1.3 million yen lower than
average, while total wealth per elderly aged 65 years or over is 66.7 million yen, which is 15.8
million yen higher than average. Housing assets account for approximately 67.8 percent of the
66.7 million yen in wealth. Yet, Japanese elderly homeowners are less likely to fund consumption
by reducing their housing wealth. Thus, as Naoi (2014) and Hori and Niizeki (2017) estimated,
changes in housing wealth appear to have limited e¤ects on elderly consumption.
It is noteworthy that in Japan, housing assets are underutilized by the elderly. First, unlike
Western countries, residential structures rapidly lose value as they age (Noguchi, 1996; Izuhara,
2016). According to the results of Yoshida (2016), the annual depreciation rate of Japanese
homes is approximately 6.5 percent.4 This implies that structures lose half of their value, on
average, some 24.8 years after construction. Yoshida (2016) suggested that buildings tend to
be demolished rapidly because they cannot meet earthquake building codes, which are updated
regularly. Noguchi (1996) and Izuhara (2016) indicated that the small Japanese resale market
for houses may create this phenomenon. Only 14.7 percent of home sales are existing homes in
Japan, which is one-sixth of the average for Western countries (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism, MLIT). Homeowners who intend to sell their properties in secondhand
4Harding et al. (2007) estimated that the annual rate of housing depreciation is 1.9 percent in the U.S.
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markets therefore have less incentive to maintain property quality, which in turn, accelerates
depreciation rates.
Second, for the rst reason, reverse mortgage schemes allow homeowners to release housing
equity based on land value rather than structure value (Noguchi, 1996; Izuhara, 2016). In
general, banks only allow outright homeowners aged 65 years or over with assessed land value of
over 100 million yen to obtain loans. Additional limitations are: the borrowing period is shorter
than 15 years, the maximum borrowing limit is less than 50 percent of the assessed land value,
and the consent of all presumptive heirs must be obtained. Institutional innovations appear to
lag far behind those in Western countries, and therefore, it is di¢ cult for elderly homeowners
to release cash from housing assets using reverse mortgage loans (Noguchi, 1996; Forrest et al.,
2003; Mitchell and Piggott, 2004).
Third, the housing assets of the Japanese elderly used to go to their children, especially
the eldest son, because patriarchy has been a common practice (Izuhara, 2004). In addition,
Japanese inheritance taxes gave preferential treatment to real estate assets as opposed to -
nancial assets (Ito, 1994; Kanemoto, 1997; Hirayama, 2010). The assessed property value for
inheritance taxes varies from 50 to 70 percent of the market value, while the rate for nancial
assets is almost 100 percent. According to the National Tax Agency, housing assets account for
approximately 50 percent of inherited wealth. In exchange, children who inherit the parental
home tend to subsidize the consumption needs of their parents (Ohtake, 1991; Mitchell and
Piggott, 2004). However, waiving inherited housing is becoming more common in Japan, par-
ticularly when it is in an unattractive location. In practice, the population decline in Japan
is leading to a surplus of houses. For example, the average ratio of vacant dwellings outside
the three major metropolitan areas has already reached 14.8 percent (the 2013 HLS).5 In such
locations, it may also be di¢ cult to sell or rent the parental home. Therefore, successors can
avoid paying the local tax on real estate by rejecting the inheritance (Hirayama, 2010).
5The three major metropolitan areas are: Tokyo metropolitan area (Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa);
Chukyo metropolitan area (Gifu, Aichi, Mie); and Osaka metropolitan area (Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara).
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Econometric model
Assuming a linear specication, the consumption function in this paper is written as:
cijt = 0 + 1wijt + xijt + i + j +  t + "ijt;
where cijt is the consumption expenditure of individual household i in region j at time t, wijt is
housing wealth, xijt is a set of other control variables, i is household xed e¤ects, j is regional
xed e¤ects,  t is time e¤ects, 0, 1 and  are coe¢ cients, and "ijt is the error term with the
usual properties.
We must address several econometric issues when estimating this model. First, there could
be confounding factors that drive both consumption expenditure and housing wealth increases
(Attanasio and Weber, 1994; Atalay et al., 2016). For example, local economic conditions are
often responsible for house price changes in the same region. They are also closely associated
with future income prospects that inuence consumption expenditure. To deal with a potential
common causal channel, we specify the xed e¤ects by prefecture (j) and for survey year ( t).
Second, household xed e¤ects (i) such as risk preference and nancial literacy tend to
impact consumption substantially, but are generally unobservable. To consider this issue, we
average this equation over time for each i as follows:
cij = 0 + 1wij + xij + i + j +  + "ij ;
where cij , wij , xij ,  and "ij are the mean of cijt, wijt, xijt,  t and "ijt, respectively. Subtracting
the averages from the original equation, household (and regional) unobserved components can
be removed by applying the within transformation:
cijt   cij = 1(wijt   wij) + (xijt   xij) + ( t    ) + ("ijt   "ij): (1)
The coe¢ cients can be estimated using the xed e¤ects model.
Third, one could be skeptical about the use of self-reported house values as a proxy for
market values in that the owners valuation could be inaccurate and include systematic bias
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toward more optimistic valuations. In fact, Kiel and Zabel (1999) showed that the average owner
overstates their own house value by 5.1 percent. Using self-reported house values can pose a
problem in our application if the measurement errors in an owners valuation are correlated
with consumption expenditure. This is possible if there are some omitted variables in our model
that are also correlated with self-reported house values. However, Kiel and Zabel (1999) showed
that valuation errors are uncorrelated with individual owners characteristics, as well as house
and neighborhood attributes. Furthermore, because our housing wealth measure is expressed
in terms of deviations from the means of self-reported values, as shown in Eq. (1), problems
arising from systematic overvaluation, which is constant over time, can be largely mitigated.6
Fourth, house values are expected to change when households move to a di¤erent house or
make any additions and/or repairs to their house, even when market prices are stable (Naoi,
2014). We thus only consider the survey period since the most recent move or improvement
for each household. This lowers the possibility of simultaneous determination of housing asset
values and elderly consumption. Moreover, we examine consumption excluding housing related
expenditure (maintenance costs) because there may be a reverse causal link between asset values
and consumption (Yang et al., 2017).7
3.2 Empirical strategies
In the following sections, we use the same data set as Naoi (2014). In his empirical analysis, he
applied the rst-di¤erence approach by dividing the sample into three age groups, i.e., house-
hold heads aged younger than 40 years (young), 4059 (middle-aged) and 60 or over (elderly).
Comparing the size of the coe¢ cients 1 in Eq. (1) by age groups tells us which channel domi-
nates among direct wealth, housing collateral, and the common causal channels discussed in the
literature (Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Attanaio et al., 2009; Sierminsska and Takehtamanova,
2012; Browning et al., 2013; Atalay et al., 2016; Hori and Niizeki, 2017). Naoi (2014) found that
the coe¢ cient for the elderly has the largest and only signicant impact, indicating the presence
6The Japan Real Estate Institute (JREI) calculates and publishes the JREI Home Price Index based on price
changes for repeat sales of secondhand condominiums in the Tokyo metropolitan area. We check that the annual
percentage changes in self-reported values of our data in the Tokyo metropolitan area closely align with the annual
percentage changes in the JREI Home Price Index.
7 Including housing-related expenditure in consumption does not fundamentally change our empirical results.
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of the direct wealth e¤ect, as the elderly are more likely to downsize their housing asset than are
the young and middle-aged. However, the impact is rather small and only signicant at the 10
percent level. As a benchmark, we conduct an empirical analysis similar to that of Naoi (2014).
Real estate is property consisting of land and buildings. In the literature, housing wealth is
dened as the combined value of land and buildings. In Japan, however, land and buildings are
valued separately. In this paper, housing wealth is disaggregated into residential land wealth
and home building wealth. Thus, secondly, we estimate Eq. (1) for the elderly by replacing
housing wealth with alternative measures such as land or building value.
Homeowners cannot raise cash and nance consumption unless they sell or trade down their
housing. However, our sample selection means that we cannot directly examine this e¤ect,
because our sample periods commence following the most recent move or improvement for each
household. Moreover, we found that Japanese elderly homeowners are less likely to sell their
housing. In this regard, any consumption responses would presumably be smaller if housing
wealth inuenced homeownersdecisions through only the direct wealth channel (Naoi, 2014).
However, the elderly can increase their borrowings to nance their consumption needs through
the housing collateral channel . To check whether the elderly chose this option, we thirdly
attempt to estimate Eq. (1) by replacing the dependent variable cijt   cij with bijt   bij , where
b is the amount of borrowing (Mian and Su, 2011; Brown et al., 2015).
Alternatively, the elderly may increase consumption through the intrafamily nancing chan-
nel by retaining their housing asset and obtaining nancial support from their children. To
examine whether the elderly choose this option, we fourthly attempt to estimate Eq. (1) by
dividing the elderly sample into households with and without children.
Finally, we examine region heterogeneity (inside/outside the three major metropolitan areas),
focusing on the elderly who have children. In a low-demand area, children tend to wave their
inheritance, and consequently, parents are less likely to receive nancial transfers from their
children.
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3.3 Data and variables
Our empirical analysis draws on the Japan Household Panel Survey (JHPS) to examine the
relationship between housing wealth and the consumption decisions of elderly homeowners. The
JHPS, sponsored by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, is a nationally repre-
sentative, large-scale longitudinal survey of Japanese households, with the survey conducted
annually in January. The JHPS comprises two sets of population surveys: one commenced in
2004 (originally called the Keio Household Panel Survey, KHPS), and the other in 2009 (the
initial JHPS sample), both of which had an initial sample of approximately 4,000 households.8
The KHPS was integrated into the current JHPS in 2014. In the following analysis, we use the
10 yearly waves of the JHPS from 2006 to 2015. The JHPS is particularly suited to address-
ing the research questions in this paper because it contains detailed information on household
consumption, the tenure mode of housing, housing wealth, and it includes a rich set of family
background characteristics.
The JHPS asks respondents to report their consumption expenditures in the previous month.
This value is then annualized by simply multiplying by 12. The JHPS also provides information
on the value of the home if owned. Our housing wealth measure is constructed based on self-
reported information in the survey (How much do you think the house and lot would sell
for in todays market?). Using this information, we dene housing wealth as the sum of
land and building values. We hypothesize that households would change monthly consumption
expenditure, and accordingly change annual consumption expenditure, when they perceive their
current housing values as having deviated from the average.
In addition to these variables, we gather a number of important economic and demographic
characteristics from the JHPS, including nancial wealth, household income, respondent age,
the number of households, and so on. Household income is measured as the total annual income
of all household members. Therefore, our income variables measure temporary rather than
permanent income.9 The dummy variables for the survey year serve as controls in all of our
8 In addition, there were random refreshment samples of approximately 1,400 and 1,000 new respondents in
2007 and 2012, respectively.
9According to the life cycle theory, changes in temporary income do not a¤ect consumption. We only include
household income to minimize a potential omitted-variable bias. For example, temporary income may a¤ect
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estimations. All monetary variables are converted to 2005 prices using the consumer price index.
The number of observations is 54,790 (9,731 households). As we examine consumption
of homeowner households in our empirical analysis, we exclude renter households, resulting
in 43,730 observations. In the JHPS, the housing wealth of single detached, owner-occupied
housing units is broken down into land and dwelling wealth. We only examine households that
own a single detached house, because homeowners who own a condominium do not report land
values. This reduced the sample to 38,688 observations. We also focus on households with
a land value of one million yen or above, because extremely low values may have less impact
on consumption, resulting in 24,751 remaining observations. As mentioned, our survey periods
commence since the most recent move or improvement for each household. This reduced the
number of observations further to 21,384. Finally, restricting the sample to those for which all
necessary information was available, our estimation is based on a total of 18,571 observations
(4,356 households).
Among the 18,571 observations, 3,019 observations have household heads aged younger than
40 years, 7,780 observations have household heads aged between 4059, and 7,772 observations
have household heads aged 60 or over.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our variables. On average, annual consumption of
the elderly is approximately 3.5 million yen, which is approximately $31,818 ($1 = 110 yen).
Household income of the elderly is the lowest among the three generations, while both housing
and nancial wealth are the highest, suggesting that the elderly are relatively asset rich, but
income poor. As mentioned, buildings lose their value rapidly in Japan. Reecting this fact,
the building values decrease with household age, as older households are more likely to have
purchased their houses long ago. Approximately 71.1 percent of the elderlys housing assets
consist of land assets. Half of the elderly are not employed, as many have reached retirement
age.
consumption when households cannot borrow funds because of incomplete capital markets.
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3.4 Empirical results
To understand whether the Japanese elderly behave di¤erently from other age groups, we rst
estimate the xed e¤ects model by dividing the sample into age groups. Table 2 presents the
empirical results.10 Similar to Naoi (2014), the results in columns [1] and [2] show that the
coe¢ cients of housing asset prices are not signicant for the young and middle-aged. Column
[3] also demonstrates that the coe¢ cient of housing wealth is not signicant at the 10 percent
level for the elderly, indicating that elderly consumption does not respond to their housing
value.11 Our results are inconsistent with those of Naoi (2014), possibly because we apply a
di¤erent econometric model with di¤erent sample selection. In the Appendix, we report the
results of additional specications of housing wealth to assess the robustness of our nding in
column [3].
Because our primary interest relates to elderly consumption, we only consider the elderly
households below. In terms of the other explanatory variables, column [3] of Table 2 indicates
the following. Economic factors such as annual income and nancial wealth have a signicantly
positive e¤ect on consumption.12 The elderly may extract money from nancial wealth to fund
consumption. We note, however, that the nancial wealth elasticity of consumption is rela-
tively small: only 0.039 (not reported). The coe¢ cients of nonworker have a signicant negative
sign. The elderly tend to decrease consumption because they appear to reduce work-related ex-
penses after retirement (Wakabayashi, 2008). The demographic attributes of household size also
matter, being signicantly and positively associated with consumption. Namely, consumption
expenditure decreases when family size declines.
10The JHPS categorizes a respondents location of residence across 47 regions and three city sizes (20 major
cities, other smaller cities, and towns/villages). Because we restricted our sample to nonmover households, the
regional xed factors are removed from the estimation equation. However, the xed e¤ect with respect to city
size, which does not appear in Eq. (1), remains in the estimation equation because municipal mergers during the
survey period have changed city sizes.
11We estimate the xed e¤ects model without any other explanatory variables except housing wealth. The
coe¢ cient is larger than that in Table 2, i.e., 4.456, but insignicant.
12Consumption expenditures of elderly households with low income may be associated with housing wealth
because they are more likely to face liquidity constraints. We thus estimate Eq. (1) incorporating a cross-term
between housing wealth and a dummy variable indicating whether household incomes are in the 25th percentile or
below. The coe¢ cient, however, is insignicant. Rather, a coe¢ cient of an interaction between housing wealth and
a dummy variable indicating whether household incomes are above the 75th percentile is positive and signicant.
These results are consistent with results for China (Yang et al., 2017).
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We expect that land wealth tends to have a larger impact on consumption than does building
wealth, as the Japanese attach more weight to the former than to the latter. To examine this, in
Table 3, we present regression results using land or building wealth, instead of housing wealth,
in column [3] of Table 2. As expected, the coe¢ cient of land wealth in column [1] has a relatively
larger value. However, again the coe¢ cient of land is not signicant at the 10 percent level.
Our sample selection lowers the possibility of consumption increases through the direct wealth
channel.13 Another option to increase elderly consumption is through the housing collateral
channel. When the elderly choose this option, their borrowings from the nancial sector should
increase. However, because elderly consumption is not associated with all wealth measures, the
elderly may not increase their consumption. Table 4 presents the estimation results of elderly
borrowing. As expected, column [1] demonstrates that borrowing is una¤ected by increases in
housing wealth. The insignicant coe¢ cient suggests that housing equity withdrawal through
reverse mortgages tends to be underutilized, as previously mentioned.14 This tendency does not
change, even when we use the alternative specication for the housing wealth measure, as in
columns [2] and [3].
The other option for the elderly to increase their consumption is to use the intrafamily
nancing channel, whereby parents receive nancial support from their children in exchange
for leaving property. Table 5 presents summary statistics of annual nancial transfers from
adult children to their parents from the JHPS. On average, adult children who expect to inherit
the parental home provide a larger amount of nancial support than those who do not. The
proportion of adult children who provide a positive transfer to parents is also higher for those
who expect to inherit the parental home than for those who do not. This may compliment the
above assumption. Table 6 presents the estimation results for the subsample with and without
children. The JHPS asks respondents to list family members regardless of living status (living
13The JHPS asks respondents whether they plan to move from their present home, build a new home, or
purchase a home. We create a dummy variable that takes the value of one if households have a plan and zero if
they have no plan for the time being, and estimate a linear probability xed e¤ects model. The estimation results
suggest that changes in housing wealth have no statistical impact on future living plans.
14The 2016 JHPS asks all respondents (N = 4993) to report their intention to use a reverse mortgage based on
the following question: How likely is it that you will use a reverse mortgage?1 = have used; 2 = very likely;
3 = likely; 4 = unlikely; 5 = very unlikely; 6 = do not know. On average, approximately 1.4 percent and 10.3
percent of respondents choose 2 and 3, respectively. However, less than 0.1 percent of them choose 1.
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together or separately). The elderly with children are dened as those who list at least one child
as a family member. Column [1] shows that a signicantly positive e¤ect of housing wealth
on consumption exists among the elderly who have children. However, the evidence suggests a
weak e¤ect in magnitude; the elasticity, which is calculated at the mean, is just 0.08.15 Namely,
a one percent increase in house price leads to a 0.08 percent increase in consumption. This is
considerably smaller than the estimates of Yang et al. (2017), who reported that a one percent
increase in housing wealth leads to a 3.0 percent increase in consumption among Chinese elderly
who live with their children. The small impact can be explained as follows. As mentioned, in
low-demand areas, children tend to waive inherited housing so that parents are less likely to
receive nancial help from their children. Selsh elderly parents who have children with limited
resources cannot increase consumption because although those children are more likely to give
parents nonmonetary help, they cannot a¤ord to o¤er monetary help (Taniguchi and Kaufman,
2017). Alternatively, some elderly parents are altruistic or have no bequest motive; therefore,
they leave housing assets without receiving nancial help from their children. Column [2] shows
that increases in housing wealth have a negative and signicant impact on consumption when
the elderly have no children, which runs contrary to our expectation. Housing prices may be
positively correlated with nursing home fees. Therefore, some elderly people who want to move
into a nursing home tend to refrain from consumption expenditures. The absolute value of the
elasticity, however, is smaller than that in column [1]. The results in columns [3] and [4] using
land wealth yield qualitatively similar ndings. Increases in building wealth, however, have no
impact on elderly consumption, even when the elderly have children (not reported).
Finally, Table 7 presents the estimation results that consider regional heterogeneity. Children
are less likely to utilize inherited housing when it is located in a low-demand area. Column [3]
suggests that only the land wealth in metropolitan areas has positive and signicant impacts
on elderly consumption. However, although we attempt to control for regional di¤erences, the
elasticity is still inelastic, as a one percent increase in land price is associated with a 0.1 percent
increase in consumption. Overall, the empirical ndings suggest that housing assets are only
15The elasticity tends to decrease when we measure it at the lower percentile of housing wealth. For example,
when we calculate the elasticity at the 75 percentile of housing wealth, it rises to 0.10, while at the 25 percentile
of housing wealth, it falls to 0.04 and becomes statistically insignicant.
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available to a small proportion of the elderly.
4 Conclusion
This paper used panel data of the JHPS to examine the role of housing wealth in the consump-
tion decisions of the Japanese elderly. After considering both common and reverse causality
between nonhousing consumption and self-reported house values, we rst estimated a xed ef-
fects model for all elderly households as a benchmark. Our results indicate that changes in
housing wealth do not have a signicant impact on elderly consumption. We then disaggregated
housing wealth into land and dwelling wealth, because the depreciation rates of residential struc-
tures are extremely high in Japan. However, again, neither of these had a signicant e¤ect on
elderly consumption. The reason underlying these relationships appears to be that elderly home-
owners cannot release any of their housing wealth through the nancial sector. To conrm this,
we estimated a xed e¤ects model by changing the dependent variable from elderly consump-
tion to their borrowings. Indeed, our estimation results demonstrated that elderly borrowing is
not associated with changes in housing wealth. Instead, elderly homeowners may leave housing
assets to their children, and in exchange, receive cash to fund consumption. The observations
were therefore divided into subgroups: those who have children and those who do not. We
only found a small signicant positive coe¢ cient for the elderly who have children. We then
conducted a subsample analysis that categorized the elderly who have children into two groups:
housing located in metropolitan or other areas. We found that the positive impact tends to
operate only in metropolitan areas where the land values are relatively high. This appears to
imply that housing wealth is only available to a limited proportion of elderly homeowners in
Japan.
The role of housing wealth in the consumption decisions of the elderly has attracted consid-
erable attention from researchers and policy makers in Japan, because releasing housing equity
may prevent not only nancial hardship among the elderly, but also nancial di¢ culty in the
social security system. Yet, the contribution of this paper is to empirically conrm that the
Japanese elderly are less likely to use their housing assets to fund consumption after retirement.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we estimate alternative models in addition to our benchmark model in
column [3] of Table 2 for robustness checks, and summarize the results in Tables 8 and 10.
Households may anticipate that residential structures lose value as they age. In column [1] of
Table 8, we construct housing wealth where building values depreciate at a xed rate of 6.5
percent (Yoshida, 2016). However, housing wealth, which considers the annual depreciation
rate, has no signicant impact on elderly consumption.
The JHPS asks respondents to report the assessed property value for property taxes. This
value has a moderate positive correlation with housing wealth. Therefore, in column [2] of Table
8, we use this variable in place of self-reported house values. The empirical results suggest that
the assessed value for property taxes does not matter for the elderly.
Although the long-term o¢ cial data on house prices are not prepared well in Japan, the
Survey on Land Prices issued by the MLIT reports the data on the price per square meter of
residential land. Hori and Niizeki (2017) used these data to estimate the value of residential
land assets. In column [3] of Table 8, we use the city-level land price instead of self-reported
house values. The empirical results again indicate that land price has no signicant impact on
elderly consumption.
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To obtain regional house prices, we average self-reported house values in every city for each
year. The empirical results are similar to the benchmark model in column [3] of Table 2: the
coe¢ cient of average housing wealth in column [4] of Table 8 is statistically insignicant.
Similar to Begley (2017), we also calculate housing price at the city-level using homeowners
self-reported house values in an AR3 process and presented in Table 9. However, note that
Begley (2017) used the market repeat-sales indices rather than self-reported values. We then
obtain the tted self-reported values at the city level. This value is more likely to capture regional
trends in housing prices. The main nding, however, is unchanged: the tted self-reported house
values are statistically insignicant, as in column [1] of Table 10.
In practice, Begley (2017) estimated the unanticipated component of housing price (growth)
by calculating the di¤erence between actual (growth in) housing prices and predicted (growth
in) house prices. Following this, we calculated the di¤erence between the actual and tted
self-reported values at the city level. This variable appears to mitigate problems arising from
overvaluation. We thus empirically examine the relationship between the di¤erence and elderly
consumption. Contrary to our expectations, column [2] of Table 10 suggests that the di¤erence
is negative, but still statistically insignicant.
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Figure.	2.	Cohort‐adjusted	homeownership‐age	profiles	over	time.	
	
Table 1. Summary statistics of main variables 
 
Variables Young Middle-aged Elderly Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Consumption (thousand yen) 3478.40 2341.68 4094.55 3047.05 3476.30 2595.07 
Housing wealth (million yen) 26.99 35.16 25.40 22.72 27.15 27.29 
Land wealth (million yen) 17.27 25.27 16.86 18.21 19.30 22.79 
Building wealth (million yen) 9.72 14.70 8.54 9.07 7.84 9.59 
Financial wealth (million yen) 5.41 12.21 9.10 15.39 20.71 26.99 
Income (million yen) 7.35 5.15 8.56 4.94 6.23 5.20 
Nonworker (dummy) 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.51 0.50 
Household size (#) 3.98 1.25 3.74 1.33 2.77 1.29 
Observations 3019 7780 7772 
 
 
  
Table 2. Empirical results of consumption by age groups 
 
Variables [1] Young [2] Middle-aged [3] Elderly 
Housing wealth 2.010 4.815 2.768 
 (2.408) (5.224) (4.135) 
Financial wealth 10.500 5.378 6.502** 
 (9.024) (4.999) (2.540) 
Income 33.229*** 53.433*** 47.657*** 
 (11.224) (17.806) (15.253) 
Nonworker −325.496 −218.213 −234.879** 
 (271.903) (263.560) (110.197) 
Household size 81.739 28.942 241.749*** 
 (74.725) (86.760) (55.761) 
City size Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Elasticity 0.016 0.030 0.022 
 [0.019] [0.032] [0.032] 
Observations 3019 7780 7772 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses and standard errors calculated by the 
Delta method in brackets. 
Elasticity measures how much consumption responds to a change in housing wealth, calculated at average 
values. 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
  
Table 3. Empirical results of elderly consumption using disaggregated housing wealth 
 
Variables [1] Land wealth [2] Building wealth 
Land wealth 4.419  
 (4.493)  
Building wealth  −1.289 
  (6.822) 
Financial wealth 6.499** 6.522** 
 (2.536) (2.545) 
Income 47.888*** 47.568*** 
 (15.314) (15.137) 
Nonworker −234.562** −234.724** 
 (110.257) (110.306) 
Household size 241.555*** 242.853*** 
 (55.833) (55.859) 
City size Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Elasticity 0.025 −0.003 
 [0.025] [0.015] 
Observations 7772 7772 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses and standard errors calculated by the 
Delta method in brackets. 
Elasticity measures how much consumption responds to a change in land/building wealth, calculated at 
average values. 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
  
Table 4. Empirical results of elderly borrowing 
 
Variables [1] Housing wealth [2] Land wealth [3] Building wealth 
Housing wealth −0.019   
 (0.026)   
Land wealth  −0.011  
  (0.027)  
Building wealth   −0.051 
   (0.042) 
Financial wealth 0.027* 0.027* 0.027* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Income 0.098 0.098 0.101 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Nonworker −0.148 −0.149 −0.146 
 (0.372) (0.372) (0.373) 
Household size 0.182 0.177 0.179 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) 
City size Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Elasticity −0.193 −0.075 −0.148 
 [0.264] [0.190] [0.120] 
Observations 7733 7733 7733 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses and standard errors calculated by the 
Delta method in brackets. 
Elasticity measures how much borrowing responds to a change in housing wealth, calculated at average values. 
* indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
  
Table 5. Annual transfers from adult children to parents 
 
 With heritability Without heritability 
Mean (thousand yen) 127.46 78.21 
 (65.23) (62.89) 
Ratio of positive transfers (%) 21.27 16.11 
Observations 11718 18514 
Note: Std. dev. in parentheses. 
  
Table 6. Subsample analysis of elderly consumption: with and without children 
 
Variables [1] With children [2] Without children [3] With children [4] Without children 
Housing wealth 11.181* −7.759*   
 (6.527) (4.269)   
Land wealth   12.529* −5.635 
   (6.864) (5.106) 
Financial wealth 8.505* 8.547* 8.616* 8.463* 
 (5.108) (4.544) (5.109) (4.527) 
Income 68.385*** 28.398* 68.921*** 28.236* 
 (22.654) (15.324) (22.855) (15.357) 
Nonworker −211.125 −116.478 −208.204 −118.678 
 (145.919) (188.742) (146.209) (188.203) 
Household size 223.138*** −67.026 222.244*** −66.668 
 (67.772) (234.137) (68.165) (233.872) 
City size Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elasticity 0.084* −0.064* 0.066* −0.033 
 [0.049] [0.035] [0.036] [0.030] 
Observations 4164 3608 4164 3608 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses and standard errors calculated by the 
Delta method in brackets. 
Elasticity measures how much consumption responds to a change in housing/land wealth, calculated at average 
values. 
*** and * indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
Table 7. Subsample analysis of elderly consumption with children: metropolitan areas and other areas 
 
Variables [1] With children/ 
Metropolitan areas 
[2] With children/ 
Other areas 
[3] With children/ 
Metropolitan areas 
[4] With children/ 
Other areas 
Housing wealth 13.646 4.222   
 (8.525) (6.186)   
Land wealth   14.552* 4.456 
   (8.767) (6.455) 
Financial wealth 4.790 13.478 4.972 13.494 
 (5.795) (9.785) (5.719) (9.856) 
Income 108.854*** 21.538 109.059*** 21.808 
 (35.864) (17.762) (36.221) (17.629) 
Nonworker −262.393 −181.022 −250.979 −183.152 
 (240.869) (156.808) (242.369) (156.661) 
Household size 270.187** 162.539* 268.145** 162.609* 
 (105.609) (91.195) (106.910) (91.161) 
City size Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Elasticity 0.120 0.025 0.096* 0.017 
 [0.075] [0.037] [0.058] [0.025] 
Observations 2093 2071 2093 2071 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses and standard errors calculated by the 
Delta method in brackets. 
Elasticity measures how much consumption responds to a change in housing/land wealth, calculated at average 
values. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 005, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
  
Table 8. Empirical results of elderly consumption using the alternative specification for the housing wealth 
measure 
 
Variables [1] Depreciated [2] Property value [3] Land price [4] Average 
Housing wealth −0.150 −6.985 −0.001 4.211 
 (2.981) (4.541) (0.003) (4.474) 
Financial wealth 5.558** 3.506 6.491** 6.505** 
 (2.725) (3.638) (2.543) (2.539) 
Income 27.758** 54.244** 45.625*** 47.3375*** 
 (10.937) (23.174) (15.254) (15.190) 
Nonworker −327.251** −235.954 −240.904** −232.466** 
 (110.592) (149.895) (111.481) (109.897) 
Household size 236.426*** 306.321*** 250.447*** 241.885*** 
 (62.828) (84.239) (56.585) (55.698) 
City size Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6507 4649 7616 7772 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 0.01 and 005 levels, respectively. 
  
Table 9. AR3 estimate for housing wealth 
 
Variables Housing wealth 
t – 1 0.186*** 
 (0.032) 
t – 2 0.008 
 (0.022) 
t – 3 0.035 
 (0.022) 
Constant 19.439*** 
 (1.548) 
Year Yes 
Observations 2370 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Model estimated using Arellano−Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator. 
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
  
Table 10. Empirical results using fitted housing wealth value 
 
Variables [1] Fitted-value [2] Difference 
Housing wealth 23.418 −1.0914 
 (45.783) (3.118) 
Financial wealth 7.796** 7.754** 
 (3.460) (3.477) 
Income 33.843*** 33.884*** 
 (11.705) (11.725) 
Nonworker −258.035* −255.735* 
 (137.407) (136.978) 
Household size 227.389*** 230.238*** 
 (64.852) (65.012) 
City size Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Observations 6644 6644 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (500 replications by household). 
*** and * indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
